

United States District Court
District of South Carolina

Chambers Agurs, #63132,)	C/A No. 8:06-0086-GRA-BHH
)	
Petitioner;)	
)	
vs.)	Report and Recommendation
)	
E. Richard Bazzle, Warden; and Henry McMaster,)	
Attorney General for South Carolina;)	
)	
Respondents.)	
)	

Petitioner, Chambers Agurs (hereafter, the “petitioner”), is a state prisoner proceeding *pro se* under Title 28 United States Code Section 2254. By definition, the relief which petitioner seeks must be based upon a finding that he is being illegally detained in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. §2241(b)(3). Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(B), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(c), D.S.C., the undersigned is authorized to review such petitions for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the District Court.

BACKGROUND

Petitioner is incarcerated at the Perry Correctional Institution, in Pelzer, South Carolina, pursuant to orders of commitment from the York County Court of General Sessions. On May 17, 1970, petitioner entered a guilty plea to a single count of murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment. He seeks relief from this conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner did not appeal from his conviction. He filed a Post-Conviction Relief (PCR) application in the York County Court of Common Pleas on November 24, 2004. See *Agurs v. State*, 2004-CP-46-3065. The application was dismissed on

September 15, 2005, and the South Carolina Supreme Court filed an order of remittitur on November 22, 2005, evidently rejecting a Petition for Writ of Certiorari.¹

Pro Se PETITION

Petitioner is a *pro se* litigant, and thus his pleadings are accorded liberal construction. *Hughes v. Rowe*, 449 U.S. 5 (1980); *Estelle v. Gamble*, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); *Haines v. Kerner*, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); *Loe v. Armistead*, 582 F. 2d 1291 (4th Cir. 1978); *Gordon v. Leeke*, 574 F. 2d 1147 (4th 1978). *Pro se* pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Even under this less stringent standard, however, a *pro se* petition is still subject to summary dismissal. The mandated liberal construction means only that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so. *Barnett v. Hargett*, 174 F.3d 1128 (10th Cir. 1999). A court may not construct a party's legal arguments for him or her. *Small v. Endicott*, 998 F.2d 411 (7th Cir. 1993). Nor should a court "conjure up questions never squarely presented." *Beaudett v. City of Hampton*, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).

A careful review has been made of the *pro se* petition pursuant to this standard and the procedural provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. The review has been conducted in light of the following precedents: *Denton v. Hernandez*, 504 U.S. 25 (1992); *Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319, 324-325 (1989); *Nasim v. Warden Maryland House of Correction*, 64 F.3d 951

¹ – The docket records of the York County Court of Common Pleas are accessible online at a website maintained by the County <<http://www.yorkcountygov.com>>. This Court may take judicial notice of these records. *Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil*, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989); *Shop v. Bell & Howell*, 872 F.2d 1178, 1182, 1989 (4th Cir. 1989); *Days v. Bounds*, 509 F. 2d 66 (4th Cir. 1975); *Mann v. Peoples First National Bank & Trust Co.*, 209 F.2d 570, 572 (4th Cir. 1954).

(4th Cir. 1995)(*en banc*); *Todd v. Baskerville*, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983); and *Boyce v. Alizaduh*, 595 F.2d 948 (4th Cir. 1979).

DISCUSSION

Petitioner attacks his conviction on several grounds: (1) the then-existing murder statute was unconstitutional; (2) he was denied a competency hearing; (3) the indictment was defective, thereby depriving the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction; and (4) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to attack the indictment. Petitioner does not claim that he has presented any of these grounds to South Carolina state courts.²

This petition should be dismissed as a matter of law, specifically the doctrines of “exhaustion” and “procedural bar.” These two separate theories operate in a similar manner to require a *habeas* petitioner to first submit his claims for relief to the state courts. The two theories rely on the same rationale. The general rule is that a petitioner must present his claim to the highest state court with authority to decide the issue before the federal court will consider the claim.

Exhaustion

The theory of exhaustion is based on the statute giving the federal court jurisdiction of *habeas* petitions. Applications for writs of *habeas corpus* are governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which allows relief when a person “is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” The statute states in part:

² – Petitioner attaches a copy of a memorandum apparently filed in his PCR proceedings, resisting a motion for dismissal by South Carolina as respondent. Petitioner advances the grounds listed above in his memorandum, but this Court is unable to determine the actual basis for dismissal of his PCR application. This Court need not speculate on this point, nor need it ponder the grounds upon which the South Carolina Supreme declined to review the PCR dismissal. It is clear from the documents that Petitioner commenced his first and only PCR application thirty four (34) years after his conviction. The procedural default is obvious upon the record.

(b)(1) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, shall not be granted unless it appears that

(A) the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State; or

(B)(i) there is either an absence of available State corrective process; or

(ii) circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant.

(2) An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the State.

(3) A State shall not be deemed to have waived the exhaustion requirement or be estopped from reliance upon the requirement unless the State, through counsel, expressly waives the requirement.

(c) An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, within the meaning of this section, if he has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented.

This statute clearly requires that an applicant pursue any and all opportunities in the state courts before seeking relief in the federal court. When subsections (b) and (c) are read in conjunction, it is clear that § 2254 requires a petitioner to present any claim he has to the state courts before he can proceed on the claim in this court. See *O'Sullivan v. Boerckel*, 526 U.S. 838 (1999).

The United States Supreme Court has consistently enforced the exhaustion requirement.

The exhaustion doctrine existed long before its codification by Congress in 1948. In *Ex parte Royall*, 117 U.S. 241, 251 (1886), this Court wrote that as a matter of comity, federal courts should not consider a claim in a habeas corpus petition until after the state courts have had an opportunity to act...

Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 515 (1982).

When the petition for *habeas* relief is filed in the federal court, a petitioner may present only those issues which were presented to the South Carolina Supreme Court through direct appeal or through an appeal from the denial of the PCR application, whether or not the Supreme Court actually reached the merits of the claim. If any avenue of state

relief is still available, the petitioner must proceed through the state courts before requesting a writ of *habeas corpus* in the federal courts. *Richardson v. Turner*, 716 F.2d 1059 (4th Cir.1983); *Patterson v. Leeke*, 556 F.2d 1168 (4th Cir.1977). If petitioner has failed to raise the issue before the state courts, but still has any means to do so, he will be required to return to the state courts to exhaust the claims. See *Rose v. Lundy*, *supra*. In cases where the South Carolina Supreme Court applied a procedural bar, however, this court is directed to also apply that bar, except in certain limited circumstances.

Procedural Bar

If a petitioner procedurally bypasses his state remedies, he is procedurally barred from raising them in this court. “Procedural bypass” is the doctrine applied when the person seeking relief failed to raise the claim at the appropriate time in state court and has no further means of bringing that issue before the state courts. If this occurs, the person is procedurally barred from raising the issue in his federal *habeas* petition. The United States Supreme Court has clearly stated that the procedural bypass of a constitutional claim in earlier state proceedings forecloses consideration by the federal courts. *Smith v. Murray*, 477 U.S. 527, 533 (1986). Bypass can occur at any level of the state proceedings, if a state has procedural rules which bar its courts from considering claims not raised in a timely fashion. The two routes of appeal in South Carolina are described above, and the South Carolina Supreme Court will refuse to consider claims raised in a second appeal which could have been raised at an earlier time. Further, if a prisoner has failed to file a direct appeal or a PCR and the deadlines for filing have passed, he is barred from proceeding in state court.

If the state courts have applied a procedural bar to a claim because of an

earlier default in the state courts, the federal court honors that bar. State procedural rules promote:

not only the accuracy and efficiency of judicial decisions, but also the finality of those decisions, by forcing the defendant to litigate all of his claims together, as quickly after trial as the docket will allow, and while the attention of the appellate court is focused on his case.

Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1984).

Although the federal courts have the power to consider claims despite a state procedural bar,

the exercise of that power ordinarily is inappropriate unless the defendant succeeds in showing both “cause” for noncompliance with the state rule and “actual prejudice resulting from the alleged constitutional violation.”

Smith v. Murray, *supra*, quoting *Wainwright v. Sykes*, 433 U.S. at 84 (1977); *see also Engle v. Isaac*, 456 U.S. 107, 135 (1982).

Stated simply, if a federal *habeas* petitioner can show (1) cause for his failure to raise the claim in the state courts, and (2) actual prejudice resulting from the failure, a procedural bar can be ignored and the federal court may consider the claim. Where a petitioner has failed to comply with state procedural requirements and cannot make the required showing(s) of cause and prejudice, the federal courts generally decline to hear the claim. *See Murray v. Carrier*, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986).

Inter-relation of Exhaustion and Procedural Bypass

As a practical matter, if a petitioner in this court has failed to raise a claim in state court, and is precluded by state rules from returning to state court to raise the issue, he has procedurally bypassed his opportunity for relief in the state courts, and this court is barred from considering the claim (absent a showing of "cause" and "actual

prejudice"). In such an instance, the exhaustion requirement is "technically met" but the rules of procedural bar apply. *Matthews v. Evatt*, 105 F.3d 907 (4th Cir.1997), citing *Coleman v. Thompson*, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n. 1 (1991); *Teague v. Lane*, 489 U.S. 288, 297-98 (1989); and *George v. Angelone*, 100 F.3d 353, 363 (4th Cir.1996).

Cause and Actual Prejudice

The requirement of exhaustion is not jurisdictional and this court may consider claims which have not been presented to the South Carolina Supreme Court in limited circumstances. *Granberry v. Greer*, 481 U.S. 129, 131 (1987). In order to have such claims considered, a petitioner must show sufficient cause for failure to raise the claim and actual prejudice resulting from the failure. *Coleman v. Thompson*, 501 U.S. at 750, or that a "fundamental miscarriage of justice" has occurred. *Murray v. Carrier, supra*. A petitioner may prove cause if he can demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel relating to the default, show an external factor which hindered compliance with the state procedural rule, or demonstrate the novelty of a particular claim. *Id*; *Clozza v. Murray*, 913 F.2d 1092 (4th Cir.1990); and *Clanton v. Muncy*, 845 F.2d 1238 (4th Cir.1988).

Absent a showing of "cause," the court is not required to consider "actual prejudice." *Turner v. Jabe*, 58 F.3d 924 (4th Cir.1995). However, if a petitioner demonstrates sufficient cause, he must also show actual prejudice in order to excuse a default. *Murray v. Carrier*, 477 U.S. at 492. To show actual prejudice, the petitioner must demonstrate more than plain error. He is required to prove that specific errors infected the trial and were of constitutional dimensions. *United States v. Frady*, 456 U.S. 152 (1982).

In *Kornahrens v. Evatt*, 66 F.3d 1350 (4th Cir.1995), the Fourth Circuit stated that once a claim is determined to be procedurally barred, a district court should not

consider the issue on its merits. The Court noted that it is always tempting to discuss the merits as an alternative reason for a conclusion, but that once a court finds an issue to be procedurally barred, all discussion which follows is only dicta. See *Karsten v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan*, 36 F.3d 8, 11 (4th Cir.1993). Once a court has determined that a claim is procedurally barred, it should not stray into other considerations.

Petitioner has not provided this Court with any basis to overlook his failure to pursue available state remedies. He has not suggested any cause for this failure sufficient to justify the clear procedural bar, under South Carolina law, against a PCR application filed over thirty years after his conviction.

Accordingly, it is recommended that the above-captioned case be dismissed without prejudice and without requiring the respondents to file a return. See *Allen v. Perini*, 424 F.2d 134, 141 (6th Cir. 1970)(federal district courts have duty to screen habeas corpus petitions and eliminate burden placed on respondents caused by ordering an unnecessary answer or return). Petitioner's attention is directed to the notice on the next page.


BRUCE H. HENDRICKS
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

January 11, 2006
Greenville, South Carolina

**Notice of Right to File Objections to Magistrate Judge's "Report and Recommendation"
& The Serious Consequences of a Failure to Do So**

The petitioner is hereby notified that any objections to the attached Report and Recommendation must be filed within **ten (10) days** of the date of its filing. 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). The time calculation of this ten-day period excludes weekends and holidays and provides for an additional three days for filing by mail. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6. Based thereon, this Report and Recommendation, any objections thereto, and the case file will be **delivered to a United States District Judge** fourteen (14) days after this Report and Recommendation is filed. A magistrate judge makes only a recommendation, and the authority to make a final determination in this case rests with the United States District Judge. See *Mathews v. Weber*, 423 U.S. 261, 270-271 (1976).

During the ten-day period, but not thereafter, a party must file with the Clerk of Court specific, written objections to the Report and Recommendation, if he or she wishes the United States District Judge to consider any objections. **Any written objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections.** See *Keeler v. Pea*, 782 F. Supp. 42, 43-44 (D.S.C. 1992). Failure to file specific, written objections shall constitute a waiver of a party's right to further judicial review, including appellate review, if the recommendation is accepted by the United States District Judge. See *United States v. Schronce*, 727 F.2d 91, 94 & n. 4 (4th Cir.); and *Wright v. Collins*, 766 F.2d 841, 845-847 & nn. 1-3 (4th Cir. 1985). Moreover, if a party files specific objections to a portion of a magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation, but does not file specific objections to other portions of the Report and Recommendation, that party waives appellate review of the portions of the magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation to which he or she did not object. In other words, a party's failure to object to one issue in a magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation precludes that party from subsequently raising that issue on appeal, even if objections are filed on other issues. *Howard v. Secretary of HHS*, 932 F.2d 505, 508-509 (6th Cir. 1991). See also *Praylow v. Martin*, 761 F.2d 179, 180 n. 1 (4th Cir.) (party precluded from raising on appeal factual issue to which it did not object in the district court). In *Howard, supra*, the Court stated that general, non-specific objections are *not* sufficient:

A general objection to the entirety of the [magistrate judge's] report has the same effects as would a failure to object. The district court's attention is not focused on any specific issues for review, thereby making the initial reference to the [magistrate judge] useless. * * * This duplication of time and effort wastes judicial resources rather than saving them, and runs contrary to the purposes of the Magistrates Act. * * * We would hardly countenance an appellant's brief simply objecting to the district court's determination without explaining the source of the error.

Accord Lockert v. Faulkner, 843 F.2d 1015, 1017-1019 (7th Cir. 1988), where the Court held that the appellant, who proceeded *pro se* in the district court, was barred from raising issues on appeal that he did not specifically raise in his objections to the district court:

Just as a complaint stating only 'I complain' states no claim, an objection stating only 'I object' preserves no issue for review. * * * A district judge should not have to guess what arguments an objecting party depends on when reviewing a [magistrate judge's] report.

See also *Branch v. Martin*, 886 F.2d 1043, 1046 (8th Cir. 1989) ("no de novo review if objections are untimely or general"), which involved a *pro se* litigant; and *Goney v. Clark*, 749 F.2d 5, 7 n. 1 (3rd Cir. 1984) ("plaintiff's objections lacked the specificity to trigger *de novo* review").

This notice apprises the petitioner of the consequences of a failure to file specific, written objections. See *Wright v. Collins, supra*; and *Small v. Secretary of HHS*, 892 F.2d 15, 16 (2nd Cir. 1989). Filing by mail pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections addressed as follows:

**Larry W. Propes, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 10768
Greenville, South Carolina 29603**